Researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory are studying the migration of fission products away from explosion cavities formed by underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site. In some cases, the isotopic composition of the fission products or activation products associated with a particular test are distinctive and we may identify them many years after the event. In this paper we describe a case in which we used rhodium isotopes to identify the source of radioactive material that had moved some 350 m from the explosion site.
Introduction

The Nevada test site (NTS)
The NTS encompasses an area of about 3600 km 2 located in southern Nevada. This region is semi-arid, with the mountains receiving less than 30 cm of moisture per year and the valleys even smaller amounts. The elevation of the NTS varies from about 1200 m to about 2100 m. Rock types in this region include Precambrian and Paleozoic carbonates, Tertiary ashflow and ash-fall tuffs and rhyolites, and alluvial fill in the valleys. Hydraulic conductivity in the carbonate aquifer below Yucca Flat is estimated to be 1-to 100-m/y; similar values are estimated for the conductivity in the brecciated rhyolites of Pahute Mesa. A more complete description of the geology and hydrology of the NTS is contained in Ref. [1] , Testing of nuclear devices began at the NTS in 1951. Since 1962 all United States nuclear tests have been underground. Over 500 such tests have been conducted at the NTS [2] . Approximately 30% of these were below the water table which lies 400-and 650-m below the land surface. Collapse of material into the explosion cavity often results in a crater at the surface.
The hydrology/radionuclide migration program (HRMP)
In 1973 a program was started at the NTS to investigate the fate of radionuclides deposited underground by nuclear testing. Of particular interest were questions concerning the possible movement of these radionuclides within or outside the boundaries of the NTS. The HRMP research project involves personnel from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the US Geological Survey, the Desert Research Institute, and the US Department of Energy. Our research includes both laboratory and field studies. We attempt to take advantage of the unique opportunities at the NTS provided by the many underground emplacements of a variety of radioactive materials.
A case study of an unusual situation
In 1984 when an emplacement hole for a future nuclear test was being drilled, tritium was detected in the formation water contained in the layered tuffs below the water table. Subsequent analyses of the water and of filtered material indicated the presence of fission products and a trace of plutonium. Since it is very unusual to encounter radioactive materials during the drilling of emplacement holes at the NTS, we wished to identify the source of these materials and to determine their mode of transport to that location. Four previous tests in the area were identified as possible sources of the radioactive materials, though all were hundreds of meters distant. The presence of rhodium isotopes in the transported material made it possible to identify the test which produced the source material. The circumstances which gave rise to this study and other aspects of our work at the NTS are described in annual reports (for example, see Ref. [3] ).
Sampling and data acquisition
The initial samples from the contaminated site were small-volume grab samples of water taken during the drilling operation. Tritium was detected by liquid scintillation counting. Later we collected 2-liter water samples in evacuated tubes; in them we confirmed the presence of tritium and also measured 85 Kr, a fission product. We collected a number of barrels (208 liters) of muddy water from the emplacement hole, filtered the water through 50 nm pore size Nuclepore filters, and evaporated the filtrate to dryness. Both the filtrate residue and the filters were counted on Ge(Li) gamma ray analyzers. Some portions of the filtrate were 102 Rh. The trace of plutonium detected through mass spectrometry had an isotopic composition indicative of early, above-ground testing. We believe this indicated a small amount of airborne contaminate had gotten into the water sample. Bore hole gamma logs showed that the radioactivity was confined to a relatively narrow zone at a depth of almost 650 m. After detecting rhodium in the residue on the filters, we separated rhodium from the other components and analyzed it by Ge(Li) spectroscopy. Our separation scheme generally followed that outlined in Ref. [4] , The separation required dissolution of the filters and residue, precipitation of Rhl 3 , formation of [Rh(CN) 6 ] 3~ complex, scavenging with hydroxide and sulfide, and precipitation of Cu 3 [Rh(CN) 6 ] 2 . This precipitate was dissolved, the rhodium was precipitated as the hydroxide, and the purified rhodium was counted as an HCl solution. The vial containing the rhodium solution was placed in a Ge(Li) well detector which was surrounded by a large Nal(Tl) detector operated in an anticoincidence mode to suppress Compton radiation.
Source identification
Timing with rhodium clocks
When rhodium is added to a nuclear test device, rhodium isotopes of mass 102 and 101 are produced by neutron reactions. The decay properties of these isotopes are shown in Table 1 . Since the two isomers of 101 Rh are formed by similar reactions, the metastable to ground state ratio at the time of production is nearly a constant for all nuclear devices. This ratio, measured at a later time, can be used to calculate the age of the sample for as long as the shorter lived metastable state can be detected (approximately 60 days). Similarly, the two isomers of 102 Rh can be used to date samples up to about seven years old. The ratio of 101 Rh to 102 Rh (particularly the two longer lived isomers) can vary by at least a factor of 10 and is device specific. This ratio changes only slowly with decay and can be Table 1 are those we used in our analyses; they were determined by one of us (JSG) by following the decay over a period of 5 years. There is also some uncertainty as to which of the 102 Rh isomers is the ground state. For the purpose of this paper it is adequate to identify them as 102 Rh(l) and 102 Rh(s) for the longer-and shorter-lived species, respectively. Furthermore, since we are able to com- pare samples from the contaminated site with recently recounted samples from each of the suspected sources, the values of the long half-lives are not essential to our analysis.
Review of possible sources
There had been four tests conducted in the vicinity of our study area prior to the drilling of the emplacement hole. We were fortunate to have on hand rhodium samples from debris recovered from each of these tests. Fig. 1 contains portions of the gamma spectra from each of these sets of test debris; these spectra were taken at approximately the same time as the spectrum from the sample being analyzed, which is shown in Fig. 2 . The spectra in Fig. 1 
Determination of the origin of the sample material
A comparison of the spectra in Figs. 1 and 2 shows very clearly that the sample spectrum most closely resembles the spectrum of test site D. A more quantitative evaluation of the data leads to the same conclusion, as illustrated in Table 2 . We concluded that the sample material was very similar to the debris from test site D. This conclusion was based on the absence of 102 Rh(s) in the sample spectrum and the similarity of the ratio 101 Rh/ 102 Rh(l) in the sample spectrum and in the spectrum of debris from test site D. The additional gamma rays in the sample spectrum are due to background detected in the very long counting period. Since rhodium was present in such low concentration in the sample, chemical separation from the other material was essential. The separated sample required counting times as long as 4000 minutes to obtain statistically valid data.
Of particular interest to us is the indication that rhodium moved some 350 m away from its initial source. We do not know whether this movement occurred slowly over the 9 years from the time of the test or occurred rapidly (perhaps by a pressure pulse injection in a fracture) at the time of the nuclear detonation. We are continuing to seek evidence which will allow us to determine the means by which the rhodium and other fission products moved. It should be noted that the data do not prove that the tritium and fission products found at the contaminated site all arrived with the rhodium. However, the fact that the radioactive material seems to be confined within a small zone does argue against general contamination from multiple sources.
Summary
Fission products and tritium were found at the site of an emplacement hole being drilled at the NTS. This unusual discovery stimulated a study of the area and resulted in the identification of the source of the contaminating material. The presence of 101 Rh and 102 Rh isotopes in the sample and at the suspected sources allowed us to determine the actual source from among several possibilities. Chemical isolation of rhodium and Ge(Li) gamma spectroscopy were essential for the success of our analyses. The mechanism by which the rhodium migrated 350 m is still under investigation. The numerous underground nuclear tests at the NTS provide a unique opportunity to study migration of fission products in igneous rock.
